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In his paper "Metaphors and Argumentation," Christian Santibáñez tackles an ambitious 
and significant project within argumentation:  tracing possible relationships between 
tropes and argument.  This is an ambitious project because it brings together key concepts 
from the rhetorical and logical traditions.  Of course, the Renaissance both codified the  
taxonomies of tropes and figures that are commonly associated with rhetoric today, and 
also witnessed the strict split of logic from rhetoric made infamous by Peter Ramus.  
Santibáñez's project would have to be ambitious because that split remains strong in most 
contemporary thinking about the distinctions among disciplines.  Of course, this is also 
the reason that his project is important.  Contemporary argumentation research has 
emphasized the crucial relationships among logic, dialectic, and rhetoric, relationships 
that must be re-established in the face of a balkanized contemporary landscape.  
Santibáñez's project contributes to larger efforts to reintegrate the rhetorical canon, 
understanding style of language and invention of arguments as necessary and related 
constituents of argumentation.   
 But as Santibáñez asks, how are they related?  Argumentation research has 
answered this question in a variety of ways, but sometimes it has been by presenting style 
of language as a delivery mechanism for arguments, or as noise which must be shut out in 
order to analyze them.  Santibáñez challenges this perspective by showing how 
metaphors could operate as substantive elements of arguments, performing the role of the  
Backing.  Santibáñez describes this function of metaphor by leaning heavily on the 
discoveries of cognitive linguists, Lakoff foremost among them,  who have made tropes 
central to their semiotic theory.  In a Whorfian attitude, Lakoff argues that the forms of 
expression of a culture, especially those which are most codified, can provide insight into 
the cognitive schemas of individual members of that culture and features of the culture as 
a whole.  Santibáñez uses this notion from Lakoff to join metaphor to Backing.  He seems 
to argue that since Backing is a premise that holds within a given argument field, and 
since a conceptual metaphor is a tacit relationship between two constituents that holds 
within a culture, the Backing would be a promising site to investigate in any effort to 
locate metaphor within reasoning.  This seems like a reasonable, if preliminary, analogy.  
Since the classic linguistic form of a metaphor makes an equivalence between two terms 
using a state verb (e.g. Richard is a lion.), it is tempting to map metaphor to argument 
premise.  Leaving aside the problem that the two terms in a metaphor will be “alien” 
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rather than “proper,” as Aristotle puts it in Poetics, the syntax of a classic metaphor does 
seem to make a match.  And it is this syntax that helps cognitive linguists describe the 
thoroughgoing conceptual metaphors than interest them. 
Santibáñez’s examples are thought provoking.  He maps the conceptual metaphor 
“the economy is an organism” as it operates in the comments of a news actor, as reported 
in a news article, and he shows how the proverb “it takes two to tango” functions in 
Jacobs and Jackson’s scholarly argument.  In the first case, he interprets the conceptual 
metaphor as Backing for a larger argument and in the second, he explodes the proverb 
into a series of distinct propositions, showing how it can be treated as a condensed 
argument that serves as a “parallel inferential scheme”.  Given his examples, I am 
tempted to disagree with a conclusion which limits metaphors to argument Backing.  
While allowing that this may explain the “economy as organism” case, I find his 
explication of the “takes two to tango” proverb better explains how the argument analyst 
might treat conceptual metaphor—as a condensed argument.  Yameng Liu has made this 
case in an article from Argumentation called “Argument in a nutshell: Condensation as a 
transfiguring mechanism in argumentative discourse” (Liu, 2004).  This conclusion 
would also seem more in keeping with the theories of cognitive linguists, who want to 
remind us that these tropes that we traditionally treat as mere style are in fact 
abbreviations of complex reasoning. 
If metaphor is condensed argument, then argument reconstruction becomes a 
method for explicating conceptual metaphors, as Santibáñez illustrates in his “tango” 
example.  The challenge for the analyst in this case is to faithfully detail the many 
implied premises based on sometimes very scant textual evidence.  This is precisely the 
situation that cognitive linguistics would predict for us.  Since conceptual metaphors 
typically function as tacit understandings, we should expect them to go unstated or to 
manifest themselves in text in only the briefest of tokens.  This situation is an extreme 
variation on the implied premise problem that routine argument reconstruction confronts.  
This does not have to be a daunting problem, as Santibáñez’s own reconstructions 
illustrate, but it is worth noting how important interpretation will be when treating 
metaphors in this way. 
Using argument reconstruction to explicate metaphors seems like an attractive as 
a way to rehabilitate them from their reputation as mere style,  but it may shift attention 
away from the features that make metaphors distinct forms of expression. As Santibáñez 
does in his “tango” example, we are led to create literal equivalents for metaphoric 
expressions on the way to explaining how they work as or in reasoning.  And this raises a 
basic problem for students of metaphor, the question of equivalence.  If the “it takes two 
to tango” proverb is a “parallel inferential scheme” that can be mapped to an equivalent 
that is more local to Jacobs and Jackson’s argument, then we may be left to conclude that 
the proverb is, in fact, mere style, an ornamental redundancy.  In order to avoid this 
conclusion, we would need some way to account for the value, argumentative or 
otherwise, of the proverb.  Santibáñez begins to develop this account when he 
compliments Jacobs and Jackson for using the proverb to create a “graphic image” which 
can provide “strength” to the argument. 
Of course, there is disagreement about the possibility of literal equivalence to 
metaphor in the first place.  Black’s interactionist perspective presents the most famous 
challenge (Black, 1955).  For Black, the interaction of the two terms in a metaphor 
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creates a unique effect that cannot be adequately explained or performed by a paraphrase.  
So literal equivalence is not possible, however tempting it may be.  Black’s perspective 
would warn us away from drawing any easy equations between the “tango” proverb and 
the “parallel inferential scheme” at work in Jacobs and Jackson’s argument.  While it may 
be parallel, it cannot be equivalent.  And this is good news for our attempts to account for 
the value of metaphor, argumentative or otherwise.  If we accept Black’s argument, then 
metaphor cannot be a mere redundancy.  But we are still left with the question about its 
value. 
In noting that metaphor can be a way to create a “graphic image” which can 
provide “strength” to an argument, Santibáñez gestures toward one answer to this 
question.  If I say, “My brother is an ox.” I have done something more than simply 
saying, “My brother is strong.”  Certainly one of the things I have done is to describe my 
brother in quite “graphic” terms, as Santibáñez emphasizes, something that I fail to do if I 
rely on the second sentence.  I have used a concrete term (a noun in this case) rather than 
an abstract term (an adjective in this case) to characterize my brother, and presumably 
this provides the listener with a discrete image on which to build some understanding of 
my brother.  Of course, it may also introduce ambiguity, as the listener may presume that 
he resembles an ox in many ways, not just in his strength.  This ambiguity is a price we 
may have to pay for the tangibility that we gain from the metaphor. This is the tradeoff 
that is often noted in discussions of popular accounts of science, where metaphors are 
often used to explain technical and abstract subjects to general audiences (Fahnestock, 
1993). If we acknowledge that metaphors can provide a “graphic image” that may help 
increase audience adherence, we are still left asking how integral metaphor can be in an 
argument.  Is the metaphor an integral component of argument (i.e. Backing) or only a 
persuasive delivery mechanism for argument? 
Though Santibáñez does not solve this problem, he has nicely framed it and has 
offered thought provoking examples.  In order to solve this problem, we need to find 
cases where metaphor is wholly essential to an argument, where a literal paraphrase is not 
possible or clearly less adequate than a metaphor.  With these sorts of examples, we could 
make a case for metaphor as integral component of argument.  Of course, on the other 
hand the case for metaphor as a persuasive delivery mechanism is well established.  
Treating metaphors as condensed arguments offers an interesting solution to the problem 
because it allows us to acknowledge the well established role of metaphors as persuasive 
delivery mechanisms while simultaneously revealing their argumentative substance (Liu, 
2004).  Rather than trying to find metaphors within arguments (i.e. as premises), this 
solution finds arguments within metaphors.  
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